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Exemplar Models and Category-Specific Deficits 
 In recent years, there have been numerous reports of patients with brain 
damage who show selective identification or recognition deficits for objects from 
specific categories (see Forde, in press; Humphreys & Forde, 2000, for reviews).  The 
most common deficit appears to be a selective impairment in the identification of 
living things, accompanied by relatively unimpaired recognition or identification of 
artificial or non-living objects. However, despite the large number of reported cases 
with category-specific processing deficits, there is still no agreement on the 
mechanisms that produce these deficits.  It is not even clear whether all such cases 
can be understood in terms of a single process or mechanism, or whether category-
specific deficits can be caused by a variety of different factors.  In this chapter, we 
explore category-specific deficits from a theoretical viewpoint that evolved from 
recent research on perceptual categorization and identification.  Although some 
efforts have been made to model category-specific deficits with connectionist models 
(e.g., Farah & McClelland, 1991; Humphreys, Lamote, & Lloyd-Jones, 1995), we are 
not aware of any attempts to apply classical models of categorization and 
identification1 to the neuropsychological data on category-specificity (with the 
exception of a study by Dixon, Bub, & Arguin, 1997, which will be discussed in 
detail later).   
Current theories of categorization (and identification, which is a special case 
in which each object forms its own category) can be divided into five groups.  The 
first group is that of exemplar models, which assume that categorization of an object 
depends on the similarity of that object to instances in memory (e.g., Estes, 1994; 
Kruschke, 1992; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986).  Second, there are 
decision-bound models, which are based on the multidimensional generalisation of 
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classical signal detection theory (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Ashby & Maddox, 1993).  
According to these models, stimuli correspond to points in a multidimensional space.  
The perceptual representations of stimuli are assumed to be variable from trial to trial, 
due to intrinsic noise in the perceptual system.  For categorization, people are 
assumed to establish linear or non-linear category decision bounds in the 
multidimensional stimulus space.  Categorization depends on the position of the 
stimulus representation on a given trial relative to the decision bounds.  Third are the 
models which explain category decisions based on the application of formal rules 
(e.g., Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). The fourth group contains various 
connectionist models of categorization (e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988), which attempt to 
explain categorization in terms of associative links between input information and 
response alternatives.  Finally, there have been recent proposals for combined models 
of categorization, which integrate elements from two or more of the theories listed 
above (e.g., Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 
1998). 
 In this chapter, we focus exclusively on exemplar models of categorization 
and identification.  There are several reasons for this choice.  Exemplar models have 
an impressive empirical track record.  They can explain categorization and 
identification of a wide range of different stimuli in a wide range of situations (e.g., 
Lamberts, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000; Lamberts & Freeman, 1999; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1991-a, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).  
Conceptually, exemplar models are well developed and understood, and their 
relations with other classes of models have been explored in great detail (e.g., 
Alfonso-Reese & Ashby, 1995; Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky, 1991-b).  Finally, 
exemplar models provide a unifying framework for a broad range of seemingly 
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disparate cognitive tasks (e.g., Brockdorff & Lamberts, 2000; Estes, 1994; Lamberts, 
in press; Nosofsky, 1991-a; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Palmeri, 1997).  
 
Exemplar models of categorization and identification 
 
 According to exemplar models, learning involves the storage of instances in 
memory. Exemplar models do not assume that learning involves the computation of 
summary representations for categories or other groups of stimuli (as presumed in 
prototype models or rule-based models).  Instead, it is assumed that each encounter 
with a stimulus leaves a separate trace in memory, and that subsequent categorization, 
identification or recognition depends on the retrieval of these specific memory traces.  
There are usually no constraints on the kind of information that can be contained in a 
memory trace. Exemplar information can be perceptual (referring to structural or 
surface properties of the object; Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988) or semantic 
(referring to aspects of its meaning). 
 Probably the most successful exemplar model to date is Nosofsky's (1986) 
Generalized Context Model (GCM).  The GCM assumes that stimuli can be defined 
as points in a multidimensional psychological space.  Each dimension of the space 
corresponds to a particular aspect of the stimulus (such as colour, size, etc.).  
Although the GCM is intended primarily as a model of perceptual categorization, 
dimensions can also refer to abstract or semantic stimulus attributes.  Similarity 
between stimuli is defined as a decreasing function of the distance between the stimuli 
in the psychological space.  We will use the following definition of similarity (which 
is a special case of the similarity notion of the GCM, see Nosofsky, 1986): 
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In this equation, the similarity between the representations of two stimuli (i and j) is a 
decreasing exponential function of the weighted sum of differences between the 
stimuli along the stimulus dimensions. wp is the weight of dimension p, and xip and xjp 
are the values of stimulus i and stimulus j on dimension p.  If a dimension is more 
heavily weighted, a difference along that dimension will affect the similarity value 
more than a difference along a dimension with less weight.  The parameter c is an 
index of discriminability. This index determines how quickly similarity decreases as a 
function of the distance between the stimulus representations (see Lamberts, 1994, for 
an extensive discussion of the role of this parameter).  If c is high, stimuli are highly 
discriminable, meaning that even a small difference between them will result in a 
relatively low similarity value. Unless we explicitly note otherwise, we will simply 
omit dimension weights from this equation in our applications of the GCM (thus 
assuming that all dimensions have the same weight). 
 If there are two alternative categories, the GCM assumes that the probability 
that a stimulus is classified in a given category depends on the summed similarity of 
that stimulus to the exemplars of the category on the one hand, and the total similarity 
of the stimulus to all exemplars in both categories on the other hand.  The version of 
the GCM that we will use states that the probability that a stimulus i is classified into 
category C is given by 
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The GCM also applies to identification tasks, in which there are as many response 
alternatives as stimuli (in other words, each stimulus requires a unique response).  The 
only difference with the categorization model is in the choice rule, which becomes  
 
∑= k ik
ij
ij SRP η
η
)|( .        (3) 
 
This rule states that the probability of a response j to stimulus i is a function of the 
similarity between stimulus i and exemplar j (which has associated response j) on the 
one hand, and the total similarity of stimulus i to all exemplars in memory on the 
other hand.  Because self-similarity is 1 in the GCM, the probability of correct 
identification thus becomes 
 
∑= k ikiSCorrectP η
1)|( . 
 
 Although exemplar models have been used primarily to account for 
categorization, identification and recognition in normal individuals, there have been a 
few attempts to apply exemplar models to neuropsychological data.  An important 
application by Dixon, Bub and Arguin (1997) will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) have recently shown that an exemplar model can provide 
insight into complex patterns of performance in patients with amnesia.  The starting 
point of their work was a series of experiments by Knowlton and Squire (1993), in 
which groups of normal and amnesic patients categorised or made old/new 
judgements for sets of visual patterns.  The results showed that the normal controls 
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performed much better than the patients on old/new recognition, whereas both groups 
performed at a similar level in categorization.  Knowlton and Squire (1993) 
interpreted this result in terms of multiple memory systems, with an implicit system 
responsible for the acquisition of categorical knowledge, and a declarative system 
responsible for old/new recognition.  In amnesics, the declarative system was 
supposed to be damaged (causing poor recognition performance), but an intact 
implicit system would still allow normal categorization performance.  Nosofsky and 
Zaki (1998) showed that it was not necessary to assume that the dissociation in task 
performance reflected an underlying dissociation in processing systems.  Specifically, 
Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) demonstrated that a single exemplar model explained 
Knowlton and Squire’s (1993) data, if it was assumed that brain damage led to a 
parameter change.  A model in which the discriminability parameter c (see Equation 
1) had a smaller value for amnesic patients than for normal controls produced the 
dissociation between categorization and recognition observed by Knowlton and 
Squire (1993), without having to assume separate subsystems for these tasks.  
Moreover, the model also explained the results from two other studies (Knowlton, 
Mangels, & Squire, 1996; Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994), on exactly the same 
assumptions. The discriminability parameter (c in Equation 1) determines how steeply 
similarity decreases with increasing distance between stimulus representations.  If c is 
high, processing is very selective, and perfect matches between representations are 
weighted far more in decision making than imperfect matches.  If c is low, even poor 
matches produce relatively high similarity values.  The value of c can have a great 
impact on the behaviour of exemplar models.  For instance, Lamberts (1994) showed 
that changes in discriminability can produce model behaviour that ranges from a 
nearest-neighbour model (in which only the most similar exemplar determines 
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categorization) to a nearly-linear prototype model (in which similarity to the 
“average” or prototype of the category determines choice).  Nosofsky and Zaki’s 
(1998) results show the potential of exemplar models to provide a single-systems 
explanation for dissociations that seem to invite a multiple-systems interpretation.  
The importance of this work for the interpretation of category-specific deficits is 
obvious.  In the past, these deficits too have been explained in terms of multiple 
semantic or memory systems (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Sartori & Job, 1988; 
Silveri & Gainotti, 1988; Silveri, Daniele, Giustolisi, & Gainotti, 1991), and we will 
attempt to show that an exemplar account produces category specificity, without 
having to assume multiple storage or retrieval systems.   
 
Exemplar storage and category-specific deficits 
 
 Now that we have defined the principles of exemplar models, we can explore 
the implications of such models for understanding the category-specific deficits 
reported in the literature.  Although most deficit studies have used identification as 
the main task, we will discuss both identification and categorization.  
An important aspect of any model of neuropsychological deficits is the 
implementation of brain damage in terms of the model's components and processes.  
Because we do not know the physiological mechanisms that might support processes 
such as those defined in exemplar models, we can only postulate plausible ways in 
which neurological damage could alter the characteristics of the psychological model.  
In this chapter, we will investigate two possible effects of neurological damage.  
Following Nosofsky and Zaki (1998), we will explore the effects of decreased 
stimulus discriminability.  We will also investigate the nonselective loss of features of 
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stored exemplars.  Not only are these two plausible consequences of brain damage, 
their effects are also quite similar to those resulting from other possible damage 
processes (such as loss of the ability to process particular dimensions). Of course, it is 
possible that neurological damage has other, unanticipated effects. It is conceivable, 
for instance, that a loss of exemplar information would be accompanied by noise in 
decision making.  For the purpose of clarifying and exploring the predictions of 
exemplar theories for category-specific deficits, assuming that brain damage results in 
random loss of features or decreased discriminability is quite sufficient. 
 Before we could start the modelling work with the GCM, we had to explore 
the structure of the objects within the categories that we were going to study.  The 
stimulus dimensions that may underlie the representations of living and non-living 
objects are unknown, so we had to make apriori assumptions about the structure of the 
living and non-living categories.  These assumptions are crucial for the modelling 
work. Even without formal demonstration, it is obvious that category-specific deficits 
are unlikely to emerge through feature loss (or any other mechanism) if the damage is 
non-selective and the categories have the same underlying structure.  On these 
conditions, category-specific deficits would only occur if the damage somehow 
affected exemplars from one category much more than exemplars from the other 
category.  If damage is non-selective (as we will assume in all the modelling), one 
would expect both categories to suffer to the same extent.  Category-specific deficits 
could only emerge exceptionally, as a result of random variation in the damage 
effects.  However, for categories that are fairly large and that contain objects with a 
large number of features (such as the living and non-living categories), category-
specific deficits would be extremely rare.  Moreover, both categories would have the 
same likelihood of being selectively affected, and this is contradicted by the far higher 
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incidence of category-specific deficits for living things in patients with brain damage.  
From these considerations, it is quite clear that exemplar models will only predict 
systematic category-specific deficits as a consequence of non-selective damage if the 
categories involved are somehow different from each other.  In the following section, 
we explore the differences between living and non-living objects that may be relevant 
for understanding category-specific deficits. 
 
Differences between living and non-living object categories 
 
In many studies in which category-specific deficits were reported, the stimuli 
were taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) collection of object drawings.  
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) have supplied norms for name agreement, image 
agreement, familiarity and visual complexity for their picture set, so it is relatively 
straightforward to determine whether the living and non-living objects used in studies 
that report category-specific deficits differed on these variables, or to design studies in 
which these variables are controlled. Interestingly, when familiarity, word frequency 
and name agreement were matched for living and non-living stimuli, Funnell and 
Sheridan (1992) found that a disproportionate impairment for living things 
disappeared in one patient. Gaffan and Heywood (1993) and Stewart, Parkin and 
Hunkin (1992) also found that the poorer performance for living things compared to 
non-living things observed in their patient disappeared once word frequency, 
familiarity and visual complexity were matched for the two categories. However, 
Farah, Meyer and McMullen (1996) found that when two of their patients were tested 
on exactly the same set of pictures but with further replications, their selective deficits 
for living things remained. Gainotti and Silveri (1996) and Kurbat (1997) also found 
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that category specific effects occurred in their patients when the normed variables 
were controlled.  Together, these results indicate that category-specific effects are not 
purely due to any differences in familiarity, word frequency and name agreement that 
might exist between the categories of living and non-living things.   
 A potentially far more relevant difference between living and non-living 
object categories concerns the similarity relations that exist between the category 
members. Various studies have suggested that the similarity structures of the living 
and non-living categories in the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set are not 
equivalent (e.g. Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Gaffan and Heywood, 1993; 
Humphreys, Lamote and Lloyd-Jones, 1995). By similarity, we mean similarity in the 
purely perceptual sense; for instance, pictures of a horse and a dog are perceptually 
similar because they both contain the same components (such as head, neck, body and 
legs). When Humphreys et al. (1988) asked normal participants to list the parts of 
living and non-living things, living things showed up as having more shared parts 
than non-living things. The authors also compared the outline contours of 
standardised drawings from different categories by normalising all the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart pictures for size and orientation, and then overlaying each picture with 
every other picture from the same category on a grid and calculating the overlap. The 
living things tended to have higher degrees of contour overlap than the non-living 
things. 
Further evidence that perceptual similarity is higher within living categories 
than within non-living categories was provided by Gaffan and Heywood (1993), using 
the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture set. Normal subjects made more errors 
naming living than non-living things when stimulus quality was degraded, indicating 
that living things are less visually discriminable (i.e., more perceptually similar) than 
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non-living things. The authors also trained monkeys to make discriminative responses 
to pictures of living and non-living things and found that the monkeys took longer to 
learn the living responses than non-living responses. Specifically, their difficulty in 
distinguishing among living things increased steeply as the number of living things to 
be discriminated increased. The authors concluded that the high levels of perceptual 
overlap in living categories caused the difficulties in discrimination between these 
items. 
We have replicated these findings ourselves. Ten subjects (undergraduate 
students) gave pairwise ratings of perceptual similarity for a randomly chosen set of 
15 living and 15 non-living pictures from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set. The 
subjects were asked to ignore what the pictures actually represented and to 
concentrate entirely on the perceptual characteristics of the drawings on the screen. 
They were asked to give each pair a rating between 0 and 9, where 0 was for a pair 
that look nothing like each other and 9 was for a pair that was almost identical. The 
living pairs were rated as being more similar to each other than the non-living pairs; 
the mean rating for living pairs was 3.69, compared to 2.49 for the non-living pairs. 
This effect was significant, t(9) = 10.39, p < .001. 
We have also achieved the same result by using the reaction time to decide 
that two pictures were different as a measure of similarity. It was assumed that for two 
very dissimilar pictures, participants would be able to decide very quickly that they 
were different. However, for two very similar pictures, more features would have to 
be processed before the differences became apparent and reaction times would be 
much slower (see Lamberts & Brockdorff, 2000). In this experiment we used 48 of 
the pictures selected by Funnell and Sheridan (1992), where norm values for word 
frequency, familiarity and visual complexity were equivalent for the living and non-
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living pictures. This particular set is useful to judge whether the living and non-living 
categories differ in their similarity profile, even when these other factors are 
controlled. The 24 living pictures and 24 non-living pictures were grouped into pairs 
of  identical and different pictures within the living and non-living categories. The 
mean time taken to correctly decide that 2 pictures were different was significantly 
longer for the living pairs (531 ms) than for the non-living pairs (518 ms), F(1, 19) = 
21.79, p < .001, indicating that the living pictures are more similar to each other than 
the non-living pictures. 
We have outlined good evidence that perceptual similarity is not equivalent 
within living and non-living categories. All the above findings indicate that for the 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set, the living pictures are perceptually more 
similar to each other than the non-living pictures. The Snodgrass and Vanderwart set 
is used to test most patients with category-specific deficits.  Therefore, we decided to 
design the categories used in the simulation work with the GCM in such a way that 
one category contained elements that were more similar to each other than the other 
category.   
 
Simulating category-specific deficits 
 
 In all the modelling work that we report in this chapter, two categories of 
simulated objects were used.  Each category contained 20 exemplars, and each 
exemplar consisted of 15 continuous dimensions. The categories were constructed in 
the following way.  First, we defined a prototype for each category.  The prototype of 
the first category had a value of 0 on all 15 dimensions, whereas the prototype of the 
second category had a value of 1 on all dimensions.  Next, the prototypes were used to 
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generate the exemplars within each category (the prototypes themselves were not part 
of the categories).  Exemplars were generated by random distortion of the category 
prototypes.  Each exemplar from the first category was obtained by adding a random 
number to the prototype value for each dimension.  The random numbers for this 
category were drawn from a rectangular distribution with a mean of 0 and range from 
–0.3 to +0.3.  The exemplars from the second category were generated in a similar 
fashion, except that the range of the random numbers was from –1 to +1.  As a result, 
there was more variability in the second category, and the exemplars from this 
category were less similar to each other than the exemplars from the other category.  
We will call the first category the “homogeneous” category, and the second the 
“heterogeneous” category.  Within each category, a total of 20 exemplars were 
generated.   
 The effects of brain damage were first simulated by randomly removing 
features from the 40 exemplars that made up the memory set.  The expected 
proportion of deleted features varied between 0 (intact memory) and 0.9 (severe loss 
of feature information).  At each level of damage, we simulated 1000 cases.  In the 
simulation, the dimension(s) that corresponded to a missing exemplar feature were 
simply omitted from the similarity calculations.  For each case, the GCM was applied 
to generate a predicted proportion of correct identification responses across all the 
exemplars within each category.  The model was also used to predict proportions of 
correct categorization responses across all exemplars within each category.  The only 
model parameter that needed clamping was c, the discriminability index (see Equation 
1).  To obtain a better overview of the model’s range of predictions, we repeated the 
entire simulation experiment with different values of c.   
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 Figure 1 shows the simulation results, separately for identification and 
categorization within the two categories, and for two different values of c (3.0 and 
5.0, respectively).   
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
The simulated results for the identification task showed a strong contrast between the 
two categories.  Loss of features had a stronger detrimental effect on the identification 
of the objects in the homogeneous category than on identification of the objects in the 
heterogeneous category.  For the categorization task, however, the opposite pattern 
occurred.  Categorization of the heterogeneous objects declined more rapidly than 
categorization of the homogeneous objects.  (Note that the absolute difference in 
performance between the identification and categorization tasks is partly due to the 
different levels of expected chance performance in the two tasks).  This pattern 
occurred for both values of c in this simulation, and further modelling work showed 
that it occurred across a wide range of category structures and parameter settings.  
Whenever one category contained exemplars that were more similar to each other 
than the exemplars in the other category, feature loss affected identification 
performance more in the category with similar exemplars, while it affected 
categorization more in the category with relatively dissimilar exemplars.  Intuitively, 
it is easy to understand why this pattern emerges.  Identification, in which each 
stimulus requires a unique response, is more difficult if a stimulus has close 
neighbours.  If features are lost, a stimulus may become less distinguishable from one 
or more other stimuli, and performance will drop. For categorization, however, close 
neighbours help, because the probability of a correct response depends on the total 
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similarity of a stimulus to all exemplars within a category.  If a stimulus has many 
close neighbours, even a large proportion of features can be lost before performance 
drops significantly. 
 Figure 2 summarises the model’s predictions for identification and 
categorization of homogeneous and heterogeneous objects, on the assumption that 
feature memory is intact, but for different levels of stimulus-exemplar discriminability 
(c).  It is immediately clear that the effects of variation in c are almost identical to the 
effects of random feature loss.  This is not surprising, given that random feature loss 
will reduce the average distance between stimuli, just as lower discriminability does. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 The simulation results show that a difference in internal similarity structure is 
sufficient to explain category-specific identification deficits as a consequence of non-
selective damage.  At the same time, the model also shows that an identification 
deficit for a homogeneous category should be accompanied by a categorization deficit 
for a heterogeneous category, if the similarity structure of these two categories is the 
main factor responsible for selective deficits.  In the following sections, we explore 
whether reported patient data are compatible with these predictions. 
 
Identification of living and non-living objects 
 
Case studies of category-specific deficits have concentrated mainly on 
identification performance.  In almost all reported cases, identification is 
disproportionately poor for stimuli from living categories (e.g., Basso, Capitani, & 
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Laiacona, 1988; Caramazza & Shelton,1998; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Farah & 
Wallace, 1992; Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys, 1997; Sartori & Job, 
1984; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984). For example, Warrington and Shallice (1984) reported 4 patients with 
difficulties in visual identification. The comprehension capacities of 2 patients (J.B.R 
and S.B.Y.) were examined in detail and a dissociation between living and non-living 
things was observed. J.B.R. correctly identified 6% of living pictures compared to 
90% of non-living pictures. A similar pattern of performance was observed for 
S.B.Y., who correctly identified none of the living pictures and 75% of the non-living 
pictures. Similarly, Farah and Wallace (1992) reported a patient, T.U., whose naming 
was disproportionately poor for fruits and vegetables even when familiarity and name 
frequency were taken into account.  In naming the Snodgrass and Vanderwart line 
drawings, he correctly named 54% of fruits and vegetables compared with 87% of 
other categories. His naming latencies were also much slower for fruits and 
vegetables than for other categories. Caramazza and Shelton (1998) also reported a 
patient, E.W., with a disproportionate impairment in naming living things. For a 
subset of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart pictures, matched for familiarity and name 
frequency, E.W. correctly named 55% of animals and 82% of non-animals. 
In addition to recording absolute identification performance for different 
categories of objects, it is also informative to look at the different types of errors that 
are reported for living and non-living things. Arguin, Bub, and Dudek (1996; see also 
Dixon, Bub, & Arguin, 1997) reported the case of a patient, E.L.M., who showed a 
selective impairment for naming living objects (39% correct responses to 66 pictures 
of animals, birds, insects, fruits, and vegetables), with relatively intact naming of non-
living objects (88% correct responses to 79 pictures of tools, clothing, instruments, 
Lamberts & Shapiro 18 
etc.). Interestingly, Arguin et al. reported a confusion matrix from a word-picture 
matching task, which showed that ELM tended to confuse the identities of living 
objects with similar shapes (e.g., banana, carrot and cucumber were often confused 
with each other, and also apple, onion, orange and tomato).  This response pattern is 
entirely in agreement with the GCM’s predictions.  According to the model, the 
probability that two individual items are confused depends directly on their similarity, 
and the model therefore predicts clusters of confusion between similar items. 
Several other reports have shown that patients with category-specific deficits 
for living things are more likely to confuse living things with other living things than 
non-living things with other non-living things (e.g., Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, & 
Bunn, 1998; Stewart, Parkin, & Hunkin, 1992; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).  For 
instance, Stewart, Parkin and Hunkin’s (1992) patient, H.O., gave the name of another 
object in the same category for 31.6% of the living things that were shown to him, 
whereas only 9.1% of his errors for non-living things were in the same category. 
Moss et al. (1998) tested their patient RC in a word-picture matching task, in which a 
spoken word was presented and the patient had to select the corresponding picture 
from an array of four. In addition to the target, there was always one distracter from 
the same category, and two distracters from other categories.  R.C. was significantly 
more accurate in identifying non-living targets than living targets.  On living targets, 
the vast majority of his errors (86%) were within-category errors, in which he chose 
an alternative from the same category as the target. 
According to the GCM, the probability that an incorrect response will be given 
that corresponds to a stimulus from the same category as the target (which we will 
call a within-category identification error) is given by 
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if the target stimulus belongs to category C and all symbols have the same meaning as 
before.  This probability is exactly the same as the probability of categorization of the 
stimulus into the correct category, minus the probability of identifying the stimulus 
correctly.  The probability of an error outside category for a stimulus i from category 
1 is 
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which is identical to the probability that the stimulus would be categorised into the 
wrong category.  Figure 3 shows the probabilities of identification errors within and 
outside category across the homogeneous and heterogeneous stimuli used in the 
simulation, for different proportions of feature loss.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Within-category identification errors are much more likely than outside-category 
errors for the homogeneous stimuli.  For the heterogeneous stimuli, within-category 
identification errors are still more likely than outside-category errors, but the 
difference is much smaller than for the homogeneous stimuli.  These predictions are 
in agreement with the confusion data that have been discussed. 
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 Arguin, Bub, and Dudek (1996) and Dixon, Bub and Arguin (1997) have 
reported another series of identification experiments with their patient E.L.M., which 
are very relevant to our account of category-specific deficits.  As we noted before, an 
important problem for any similarity-based account of category-specific deficits is 
that the dimensions which are used to encode real objects are unknown.  In 
mainstream categorization research, this problem is overcome by using artificial 
stimuli that vary along well-defined dimensions (e.g., Lamberts, 1995, 1998; 
Lamberts & Freeman, 1999; Medin & Schaffer, 1978), or by using techniques such as 
multi-dimensional scaling to infer the locations of stimuli with continuous dimensions 
in psychological space (e.g., Nosofsky, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).  Arguin et 
al. (1996) chose the first solution, and overcame the problem of unknown stimulus 
dimensions by using a set of artificial stimuli that varied on three dimensions.  The 
stimuli were computer-generated blobs that varied in bending, elongation and 
tapering.  Four different blobs were simultaneously presented in the four corners of 
the screen, for a short time.  One of these blobs was then centrally presented, and 
E.L.M. was asked to point to that blob’s former location.  The most important 
manipulation in this experiment was the structure of the set of four blobs presented in 
a single trial.  In single-dimension sets, the four blobs differed on one dimension only, 
and all had the same values on the other two dimensions.  In conjunction sets, the 
blobs varied on two dimensions, while the third dimension was held constant.  The 
conjunction sets were designed such that both variable dimensions needed to be 
processed in order to identify the stimulus.  E.L.M. performed consistently better on 
the single-dimension sets (29% errors) than on the conjunction sets (57% errors). 
Arguin et al. further showed that E.L.M. did not have a perceptual problem with 
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processing multiple dimensions, from which they inferred that his problems with 
conjunctive sets were based in memory.   
 Dixon et al. (1997) argued that E.L.M.’s performance in the Arguin et al. 
(1996) study was incompatible with any of the existing neuropsychological theories 
of category-specific deficits.  However, they did show that an exemplar model of 
identification (Kruschke’s, 1992, ALCOVE) could explain the results.  ALCOVE is 
based directly on the GCM.  It is presented as a connectionist model, in which 
backpropagation is used to learn dimension weights and exemplar strengths.  Because 
Dixon et al. (1997) did not attempt to fit learning curves, there is no real need to apply 
ALCOVE to their data, and we will therefore present their arguments in terms of the 
GCM.  Dixon et al. (1997) point out that optimal performance in the single-dimension 
task would be achieved by selectively weighting the relevant dimension more than the 
two irrelevant dimensions.  This is predicted by the attention-optimisation hypothesis 
(see Lamberts, 1999; Nosofsky, 1986), which states that subjects will tend to use 
dimension weights that maximise performance in a given task.  ALCOVE is designed 
explicitly to implement this selective weighing process.  In the conjunctive 
conditions, the same weighting mechanism should emphasise the two relevant 
dimensions.  Dixon et al. (1997) show that the exemplar model predicts E.L.M.’s 
performance, if it is assumed that dimension weights are close to optimal and stimulus 
discriminability is low (which is the same assumption as that of Nosofsky & Zaki, 
1998). Arguin et al.’s (1996) results are thus entirely compatible with our exemplar-
based account.  The exemplar model also explains other, potentially more puzzling 
aspects of E.L.M.’s performance.  In another series of experiments, Dixon et al. 
(1997) showed that the dimensionality effect of the earlier study was modulated by 
semantics. When the same shapes were paired with semantically close or disparate 
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sounds or labels, E.L.M.’s error rates in the conjunctive task showed a strong 
correlation with the semantic proximity of these sounds or labels, whereas there was 
no such relation in the single-dimension task.  An exemplar model predicts these 
effects, if it is assumed that discriminability is low, that optimal weighting occurs, and 
that the stimulus labels form an intrinsic part of the stimulus representation, such that 
similarity depends both on visual and semantic features (Dixon et al., 1997). 
 
Categorization of living and non-living objects 
 
 Although most studies of category-specific deficits have focused on naming or 
identification, it is important for an evaluation of our account to contrast identification 
performance with categorization.  Objects can be categorised at many different levels 
(see Murphy & Lassaline, 1997), and we are not aware of many systematic 
comparisons between categorization performance at different levels in patients with 
category-specific identification deficits.  However, there have been several studies 
that show preserved categorization abilities in categories for which naming deficits 
occurred, as predicted by the GCM. 
Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys (1997) carried out a number 
of experiments with their patient S.R.B., and found that his naming ability (tested 
with the Snodgrass and Vanderwart pictures, photographs and real objects) was 
impaired more for living objects than for non-living objects. Reaction times were 
slower and more errors were made for items from living categories and this was not 
confounded by name-frequency, familiarity or visual complexity. Forde et al. (1997, 
Experiment 19) also examined S.R.B.’s ability to categorise living and non-living 
things. He was shown line drawings of fruit, vegetables, animals and tools and asked 
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to classify them into their respective categories. S.R.B. scored very highly in this task.  
His only errors were classifying a watermelon as a vegetable and an artichoke as a 
fruit.  
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) observed that their patient, E.W., made many 
more errors when naming living pictures than non-living pictures. The authors 
commented that the nature of the errors E.W. made for living things were quite 
different to the kinds of errors made for non-living things. In particular, for 34/47 
living pictures, E.W. either said “I have no idea what it is” or produced a semantically 
related response. For example, when shown a picture of a Zebra, E.W. responded, 
“Gorilla, I think but I’m not sure”. By contrast, she only produced 5 of 137 semantic 
or “don’t know” responses to items in other semantic categories. Caramazza and 
Shelton (1998) also observed that E.W. could distinguish animals from artefacts so 
she had no selective impairment in categorising animals. E.W. was also shown to 
have no difficulty in answering questions concerning attributes shared by all members 
of a category. This indicates, again, that her problem lay in distinguishing amongst 
highly similar exemplars whereas she was unimpaired for tasks that require grouping. 
Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield and Bunn (1998) have looked explicitly at 
categorization versus identification performance for their patient, R.C. Tested with the 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture set, R.C. was able to name 50% of the pictures of 
artefacts, compared to only 9% of pictures of living things.  Similar results were 
obtained in a naming task with a different set of stimuli (photographs matched for 
familiarity).  In many cases in which R.C. failed to name the item, he was still able to 
provide some information about it.  For 63% of the naming errors made on the living 
things in the test set, this included the correct superordinate name (e.g., animal for 
donkey, or fruit for peach), which indicates that his categorization abilities with these 
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objects were relatively well preserved.  Superordinate names were hardly ever 
produced for the non-living things. It is interesting to note that Stewart, Parkin and 
Hunkin’s (1992) patient H.O. produced a similar pattern of errors in a naming task. 
For 10.5% of the errors H.O. made to living pictures, he gave the superordinate name 
but did this for only 4.5% of his errors for non-living pictures. This indicates that, for 
the living things, he was sometimes aware of the category the object was from even 
when he could not identify the object. Moss et al. (1998) also carried out a direct test 
of  R.C.’s ability to categorise colour photographs of living and non-living objects 
into their superordinate categories.  R.C. was able to categorise the living things very 
accurately (93% correct), scoring within the normal range.  However, his ability to 
categorise the non-living objects  (83% correct) was below the range for controls.   
To summarise, we have shown that for patients, identification is most often 
worse for living things than for non-living things, whereas classification performance 
shows the opposite trend. Patients can often categorise living things even when the 
individual name is not known. They are often able to identify the superordinate for 
living things and often confuse the target with a member of the same category.  This 
is less often the case for non-living things. In the cases where grouping of living and 
non-living things is compared, patients’ selective deficit for living things disappears 
and in some cases, they perform better for living than non-living things for these 
tasks. The GCM predicts all these differences. 
 
Is a similarity-based account sufficient to explain category-specific deficits? 
 
 Thus far, we have demonstrated that a classical exemplar model of 
categorization and identification predicts significant aspects of category-specific 
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deficits in patients with visual agnosia, if it is assumed that the categories of living 
and non-living objects have a different internal similarity structure.  The question 
remains whether such a simple account is sufficient to explain all aspects of 
performance in patients with category-specific deficits. 
The model that we proposed certainly fails to explain why some patients show 
identification deficits for non-living objects.  Indeed, although the vast majority of 
studies have reported identification deficits for living things, there have been a few 
reports of patients with impaired identification of non-living objects (e.g., Hillis & 
Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 
1987, 1994). Without attempting to dismiss these findings, it is worthwhile to explore 
their implications for our account.  In the three case studies by Warrington and 
McCarthy (1983, 1987, 1994), the stimuli were not matched for a number of potential 
confounds, including frequency, visual complexity and familiarity (see Funnell & 
Sheridan, 1992).  It is possible that one or more of these variables contributed to the 
unusual outcome of the case studies.  However, the same argument does not apply to 
the results reported by Hillis and Caramazza (1991) and Sacchett and Humphreys 
(1992).  Hillis and Caramazza (1991) used the same stimuli and test procedures with 
two patients, one of whom showed a selective deficit for living things, whereas the 
other was impaired on non-living things. Sacchett and Humphreys (1992) controlled 
for a number of confounding variables, and still observed a selective naming deficit 
for non-living things. 
It is clear that the exemplar model that we used cannot explain these last two 
sets of data, without making additional assumptions about the structure of categories 
of living and nonliving objects or about the effects of brain damage.  In fact, the 
model can readily produce a double dissociation like the one reported by Hillis and 
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Caramazza (1991) (or any other dissociation, for that matter) if it is assumed that 
damage is selective and somehow affects exemplars from one category more than 
exemplars from another category.  Alternatively, one could assume that particular 
stimulus dimensions would have different weights in the identification of living and 
nonliving objects.  A commonly cited distinction is that between functional and 
perceptual features, where the former are assumed to be more important for the 
identification of nonliving objects, and the latter have more weight in the 
identification of living things (see Farah & McClelland, 1991; Sacchett & 
Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).  On these assumptions, the model 
can trivially produce a double dissociation between identification of living and non-
living objects by selective damage to the representation or the processing of 
perceptual or functional stimulus dimensions.  However, neither of these accounts are 
very satisfactory.  Apart from being largely ad hoc, they fail to explain why selective 
deficits for non-living objects are so rare. Perhaps it is safest to reserve judgement 
about the importance of deficits for non-living objects, until more cases have been 
documented and the crucial variables that underlie these deficits are better 
understood.   
 Other data that are potentially challenging for the model are those obtained in 
conditions where similarity within categories has been controlled or measured, and in 
which category-specific identification deficits appear unrelated to similarity 
differences between categories. For instance, Sartori, Miozzo and Job (1993) claim 
that higher perceptual similarity between living things is not the cause of their 
patient’s impairment. Sartori et al. (1993) tested their patient, Michelangelo, using 
drawings of animals and artefacts taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set plus 
line drawings in a similar style. 7 subsets of animals and 6 sub-sets of artefacts were 
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chosen with high within-set visual and semantic similarity. Undergraduates rated the 
global similarity of items in each subset and the ratings for animal and artefact subsets 
did not differ significantly. When Michelangelo was asked to name these pictures, his 
selective deficit for living things remained. 
 These results were not confirmed in a number of other studies, in which 
similarity-related effects have been observed directly.  Livingstone (1988) studied a 
patient's  ability to point to a named picture either amongst visually similar or visually 
dissimilar distracters, and found that the patient performed much better when in the 
visually dissimilar condition, even within living categories for which he was 
impaired.  
Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati and Humphreys (1997) provided direct evidence 
that similarity rather than the living/non-living distinction was the crucial variable in 
S.R.B.’s performance. The authors have taken into account the structural similarity of 
the pictures when testing S.R.B.’s naming ability. They used the 76 Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart pictures from Humphreys et al. (1988), who grouped these pictures into 
structurally similar categories (animals, fruit, vegetables) and structurally different 
categories (clothing, tools, furniture). Structural similarity was determined by the 
number of rated common parts per category and the average percentage of contour 
overlap relative to other objects from the same category. Forde et al. found that S.R.B. 
was significantly more impaired at naming items from structurally similar categories 
(71% correct) compared to structurally dissimilar categories (95% correct). In fact, 
when a regression analysis was carried out on S.R.B.’s reaction time to name 59 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart pictures, the authors found that the living /non-living 
distinction was not a significant predictor of performance when measures of structural 
similarity were taken into account. Instead, degree of contour overlap with other 
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category members was the only significant predictor. Further evidence that structural 
similarity is behind S.R.B.’s deficit is that his subordinate naming of items from 2 
categories of particular interest to him, dogs and cars, was very poor. He was worse 
for dogs (17%) than cars (57%) but this general problem at retrieving subordinate 
names is consistent with the hypothesis that high levels of structural similarity 
between category members make identification difficult. 
Together with the results that we have reviewed in the previous sections, such 
findings suggest that similarity is often at the root of patients’ problems in identifying 
living things. Studies in which a selective deficit remains after similarity is controlled 
run counter to the general trend. In the case of Sartori et al.'s (1993) study, it is 
doubtful as to whether their measure of similarity was adequate. They found that 
when ratings of overall similarity were obtained for sub-sets of pictures, no 
differences between living and non-living sets were found. This certainly does not 
stand up to findings from our own experiments, in which more rigorous measures of 
similarity were made for pictures from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set. Humphreys 
et al.'s (1998) analyses of shared parts and contour overlap, Gaffan and Heywood’s 
(1993) discriminability analyses, and our own pairwise ratings and reaction time 
experiments all showed the living pictures to be reliably more similar to each other 
than the non-living pictures. The stimuli used by Sartori et al. (1993) mainly included 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart pictures, so it is likely that the average perceptual 
similarity still differed between categories.  Sartori et al.'s (1993) assessment of 
similarity was perhaps not sensitive enough to show relevant differences between the 
categories.  
   
Conclusions 
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 We have demonstrated in this chapter that a classical exemplar model of 
categorization and identification explains many aspects of category-specific deficits in 
patients with brain damage, on the assumption that the categories involved have a 
different similarity structure.  The most important prediction from the model concerns 
the apparent dissociation between identification and categorization.  The 
neuropsychological data that allow a comparison between these two tasks generally 
support the model’s predictions. 
 The exemplar account does have some characteristics that make it an attractive 
alternative for existing models of category-specific deficits.  The model has been 
developed outside the neuropsychological literature, and has become one of the best-
tested and most productive theories of perceptual categorization, identification and 
recognition.  The model’s simplicity and formal rigour are further assets. Of course, 
we cannot claim that exemplar models readily explain all aspects of category-
specificity, but the models’ scope and implications certainly merit further study. 
 Another important topic for further work would be to explore the relation 
between our proposal and other single-systems accounts of category-specific deficits.  
For instance, there is a complex relation between various connectionist models of 
category-specific deficits (e.g., Devlin et al., 1998; McRae et al., 1997; Rogers & 
Plaut, this volume) and our exemplar account.  Several connectionist accounts rely 
heavily on the notion that patterns of correlations between features are important for 
understanding category-specific deficits, and there is independent empirical evidence 
to confirm the importance of these correlation patterns (e.g., McRae, this volume).  
Exemplar models preserve complete information about feature correlations, and they 
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seem therefore excellently suited to explain the role of correlations in category-
specific deficits.   
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Footnotes 
1In this chapter, we use the terms categorization, identification and recognition in the 
following way.  Categorization refers to a decision situation, in which objects have to 
be assigned to categories.  The number of categories (i.e., the number of response 
alternatives) is smaller than the number of different objects that can occur, which 
implies that several objects require the same response.  Identification is a special case 
of categorization, in which each object forms its own category.  In an identification 
task, the number of response alternatives is the same as the number of possible 
objects.  Finally, recognition refers specifically to old-new recognition, in which a 
decision is made as to whether an object has been encountered before, regardless of 
its category membership or identity. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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